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Recent Developments 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEX-
BASED MORTALITY TABLES 
I n Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Compen-sation Plans 4.1. Nathalie Norris 
_U.S.-. 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d. 
1236 (1983), the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that an employer 
may not offer its employees' life annuity 
plans from private insurance companies 
that use sex-based actuarial mortality 
tables. To allow employers to do so, the 
Court found, would in effect permit the 
practice of discrimination on the basis of 
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.c. §§ 2000 et seq., which makes it 
unlawful employment practice "to dis-
criminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin." 
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1964). 
I. 
Since 1974, Arizona's Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity 
and Deferred Compensation plans has 
administered a deferred compensation 
plan whereby it has selected several 
insurance companies to participate in 
the "Plan" and, in turn, has offered its 
employees to enroll in the plan. When 
an employee chooses to participate in 
Arizona's plan, he must designate one of 
the participating companies chosen by 
Arizona in which he wishes to invest his 
deferred wages. Once the employee so 
designates and decides the amount of 
compensation to be deferred each 
month, Arizona is responsible for 
withholding the appropriate sums from 
the employee's wages and directing 
those sums to the appropriate company. 
Insurance companies generally base 
the amount of monthly retirement 
benefits due a retired employee on: 1) 
the amount of compensation the em-
ployee defers; 2) the employee's age 
at retirement; and 3) the employee's sex. 
All the companies chosen by Arizona to 
participate in the plan employ sex-based 
mortality tables to calculate benefit 
amounts. The tables award a man larger 
monthly payments than a woman who 
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deferred the same amount of compensa-
tion and retired at the same age. 
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie 
Norris, an employee of the Arizona 
Department of Economic Security, 
elected to participate in Arizona's plan, 
and invested her deferred compensation 
in Lincoln National Insurance Com-
pany's fixed annuity contract. Norris, 
103 S.Ct. at 3495. 
On April 25, 1978, Norris brought 
suit against the state, the governing 
committee and several of its members, 
alleging that the plan discriminates on 
the basis of sex. 
II. 
The Court's opinion first probed the 
question of whether the defendants 
would have violated Title VII had they 
conducted the entire plan themselves, 
without the participation of any insur-
ance companies. The Court found 
direction in its opinion in Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power 4.1. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which 
was apparently the first challenge to 
contribution differences based on valid 
actuarial tables since the enactment of 
Title VII in 1974. In Manhart, the Court 
held that an employer had violated the 
statute by requiring its female employees 
to make larger contributions to a 
pension fund than male employees in 
order to obtain the same monthly 
benefits upon retirement. The Court 
found that the pension fund treated each 
woman "in a manner but for (her) sex 
would (have been) different." 435 U.S. 
at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, 
Employment Discrimination and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of I964, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971). 
Applying the "but for" standard 
illustrated in Manhart, the Court in 
Norris wholly rejected the defendants' 
contention that the Arizona plan does 
not discriminate on the basis of sex 
because a man and a woman who defer 
the same amount of compensation will 
obtain upon retirement policies having 
approximately the same present actuarial 
value. The Court found no difficulty in 
holding that the "classification of 
employees on the basis of sex is no more 
permissible at the pay-out stage of a 
retirement plan than at the pay-in 
stage." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497. It 
further noted that the defendants' 
assumption that sex may be properly 
used to predict longevity is inconsistent 
with the lesson of Manhart: that Title 
VII requires employers to treat their 
employees as individuals, not " 'as 
simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual, or national class.'" Norris, 103 
S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435 
U.S. at 708 (emphasis by Court). 
Thus, the majority opinion established 
that "it is just as much discrimination 
'because of... sex' to pay a woman lower 
benefits when she has made the same 
contributions as a man as it is to make 
her pay larger contributions to obtain 
the same benefits." Id. at 3499. 
continued on page 14 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
COPYRIGHTABILITY 
I n Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the denial of Apple's motion 
for preliminary injunction seeking to 
restrain Franklin from infringing copy-
rights on 14 of its software programs. 
The unanimous three-judge panel ruled 
that copyright protection does extend to 
operating programs. 
Franklin manufactures and sells the 
Ace 100 personal computer designed to 
be "Apple compatible" so that peri-
pheral equipment and software designed 
for the Apple II could be used in 
conjunction with the Ace 100. In order 
to achieve this compatibility, Franklin 
admittedly copied 14 of Apple's opera-
ting system programs (the instructions 
which tell the computer which functions 
to perform). Operating programs can be 
stored on a variety of memory devices 
such as semi-conductor "micro-chips," 
which are connected to the circuitry, 
and "floppy disks" (flexible magnetic 
disks similar to phonograph records). 
These programs are referred to as 
software, whereas the machinery of the 
computer is known as hardware. 
Franklin explained that designing its 
own programs would be impractical and 
would not ensure 100% compatibility 
because "there were just too many entry 
points in relationship to the number of 
instructions in the program." Apple, 
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended, 
however, that the operating programs 
were not copyrightable; first, because 
they are embedded on a micro~chip and 
are therefore a form of machinery and 
second, because they cannot be distin~ 
guished from the concept of operating 
the computer system, they are more 
than the mere expression of an idea. 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102 
(1976). 
Both of Franklin's arguments were 
rejected by the court which reasoned 
that the programs do not meet the 
requirements of the Copyright Act of 
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The 
programs are "literary works," and they 
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court 
went on to hold that "the medium is not 
the message" and the fact that a program 
is recorded on a device which is part of 
the machinery is a mere change in the 
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251. 
In response to Franklin's second argu~ 
ment that an operating system is a mere 
method of operation and not protected, 
the court relied on Congress's Commis~ 
sion on New Technological Uses report 
which stated "[t]hat the words of a 
program are used ultimately in the 
implementation of a process should in 
no way affect their copyrightability." id. 
The court also found that Apple was 
seeking only to copyright the instructions 
and not the computer operating method. 
With the growing number of personal 
computers in businesses and private 
homes throughout the United States, 
this decision protects not only large 
computer companies such as Apple, but 
also the individual computer operator 
who creates hislher own operating 
program. ~ 
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LACK OF JURY 
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
I n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
clarified the bases upon which a motion 
for new trial made as a result of a juror's 
failure to disclose information on voir 
dire will be granted. To prevail upon 
such a motion, a party must show that a 
juror's answer to a material question on 
voir dire was dishonest and that had the 
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~ 
lishing a challenge for cause would have 
been present. 
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood 
and his parents brought suit against 
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~ 
porated to recover damages for injuries 
sustained by Billy when his feet came in 
contact with the blades of a riding lawn 
mower manufactured by McDonough, 
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors 
were asked if they or any of their family 
members had ever sustained a severe 
injury. One individual, who eventually 
became a member of the jury, failed to 
respond to this question. After the trial, 
the United States District Court entered 
judgment upon a jury verdict for 
McDonough, Inc. 
After entry of the judgment, the 
Greenwoods requested and received 
permission to approach the jurors in an 
attempt to elicit information regarding 
injuries sustained by them or members 
of their families. Despite discovery of 
evidence that a juror had not disclosed 
information regarding such injuries, the 
district court denied the Greenwood's 
motion for a new trial, stating that the 
jury verdict was fair and well~supported. 
The Greenwoods appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
which reversed the district court judg~ 
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir. 
1982), the court of appeals held that the 
Greenwood's right of per~emptory 
challenge had been prejudiced because 
of the juror's failure to respond to a 
question on voir dire. To cure the error 
of the juror's "probable bias," a new 
trial was granted. The Supreme Court 
however, reversed, holding that a new 
trial will not be granted unless a juror's 
nondisclosure results in a partial jury. 
The court's opinion begins by tracing 
the legislative and judicial history of the 
harmless error rules. These rules were 
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate 
review procedures because at one time 
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the 
trials... as impregnable citadels of 
technicality" with trials representing 
attempts to get reversible error on the 
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the 
harmless error rules is that courts, in 
their judgment, can disregard errors in 
the proceeding which do not interfere 
with the fairness of the trial. 
continued on page 24 
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
F or the first time in Maryland, a trial court has held that expert testimony on the victim's emo~ 
tional trauma is admissible in a rape 
case to show the victim did not consent 
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket 
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County November 4, 1983). 
Relying on consent as his defense, 
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a 
psychiatrist described the symptoms 
the complainant suffered, and testified 
that they were attributable to the 
emotional condition known as rape 
trauma syndrome. 
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific 
type of stress disorder which arises 
from the emotional impact of being 
raped. The symptoms most commonly 
associated with rape trauma syndrome 
include fear of men in general, fear of 
being alone, fear of being raped again, 
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of 
appetite, depression, and a sense of 
shame. 
Without the support of expert 
testimony on rape trauma syndrome, 
the defense of consent was often 
difficult to disprove because of lack of 
physical evidence. Many times the 
decision in such a case would be based 
solely on the testimony of the com~ 
plainant and defendant; therefore, the 
credibility of each testimony was 
critical in the determination of the 
outcome. By allowing the expert to 
testify, the complainant's testimony 
that she did not consent to intercourse 
can be corroborated by the testimony 
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony, 
therefore, could significantly strengthen 
the prosecution's case. 
Only a handful of states have directly 
decided the issue of admissibility of rape 
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only 
state with more than one decision on 
point, has held that the admission of 
expert testimony on rape trauma 
syndrome is reversible error. State v. 
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